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THE EDUCATIONAL PARADOX
Historically, various clauses of the United States Constitution are the basis
for recurring controversy. In 1913, eight months after ratification of the Six-
teenth Amendment,' the first income tax act 2 became effective. Legislators were
not then as concerned with education in business as today.
Since World War II our society has placed greater emphasis on education.
Growth of business, advanced technology, and the competitive nature of our
economy necessitated a better-educated labor force. In order to meet the demands
of the business community, the original income tax act 3 had to undergo extensive
modification.
This article examines the present and future status of the law concerning
educational expense deductions under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.4
The Internal Revenue Code5 never specifically provided for educational ex-
pense deductions. Section 16 2 ,C however, provides, "There shall be allowed as a
deduction all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the tax-
able year in carrying on any trade or business." Applying a literal construction
of this section, the only way that educational expense deductions could be al-
lowed was to find that they were ordinary and necessary in carrying on a trade
or business. The terms ordinary and necessary, however, were nebulous terms
which caused considerable litigation.
Until 1933, the phrases ordinary and necessary were given a literal interpre-
tation. The courts construed them to mean only that which was needed to per-
petuate the business. This point is best exemplified in Welch v. Helvering7 where
the United States Supreme Court declared that ordinary is a variable. Any busi-
ness expense will become ordinary when not unique in the business community
of which the taxpayer is a part. Accordingly, ordinary business expense will vary
with the economic conditions and the vicissitudes of life.
The Tax Court had consistently limited ordinary and necessary business
expenses to the purchase of assets which had a direct relation to the nature of
the business or profession. In accordance with the thinking during the 1920's
and 1930's, and because the country was trying to stabilize business and the
overall national economy, expenses were favored only if they bore some direct
relation to the final product. It was generally considered that education had only
1 U.S. Const. Amend. XVI (1913) : "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."
2 38 Stat. 1067.
8 Id.
4 Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
5 Id.
6 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §162.
7 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
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incidental relation to the end result. Education is not a tangible that can be
molded or attached to any other piece of property. On the contrary, educational
expenses were regarded as personal expenditures for nondepreciable assets.8 Un-
der Section 272,' the deductions would not be allowed as personal expenses and
Section 26310 would prohibit the deduction as an acquisition of a capital asset.
As early as 1921, the Treasury Department in O.D. 984,11 declared that the
costs of summer school classes attended by teachers to keep abreast of their sub-
ject areas were personal expenses and, therefore, not deductible. In Welch v. Hel-
vering,12 the United States Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether
payment to creditors of petitioner's bankrupt company was an ordinary expense.
The petitioner's primary motivation was to improve his reputation. The Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Cardozo, declared in dictum that "reputation and
learning are akin to capital assets, like the goodwill of an old partnership. For
many they are the only tools with which to hew a pathway to success. The money
spent in acquiring them is well and wisely spent. It is not an ordinary expense
in the operation of a business."' 8 One can see that the reference to the cost of
education as a personal expense was made only to illustrate the point that educa-
tion is knowledge obtained for its own sake. This dictum established the basis
for many later decisions.
In the middle 1930's, when the country was beginning to recover from the
impact of the depression, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Blackmer v.
Commissioner,14 opened the doors towards the allowance of educational expenses
as necessary to the perpetuation of a business enterprise. In that case, the court
explained that necessary meant "appropriate and helpful," limited only to the
taxpayer's ingenuity while exercising prudent business discretion. In Hill v.
Commissioner,15 the court was faced with the question of whether a school
teacher was correct in deducting the cost of attending summer school as an or-
dinary and necessary expense. The teacher already had a college degree and a
full-time teaching certificate. She was informed that once her certificate expired,
it could not be renewed unless she complied with state regulations by 1) present-
ing additional college credit earned during the life of the certificate, or 2) pass-
ing an examination. The taxpayer chose the first alternative and sought to deduct
the expenses incurred under Section 162.16 The Commissioner disallowed the
deductions, stating that school teachers do not ordinarily attend summer school
classes when there are other alternatives. Based on that assumption, the court
8 Colony Coal and Coke v. Commissioner, 52 F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1931).
9 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 272.
10 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 263.
11 1921-5 Cum. Bull. 171.
12 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
18 Id. at 112.
14 70 F.2d 255, 256 (2d Cir. 1934).
15 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
16 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23. Hereinafter this section will be referred to as Section
162 of the 1954 Code.
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followed the language in O.D. 89217 that "the expenses incurred by school teach-
ers in attending summer school are in the nature of personal expenses incurred
in advancing their education and are not deductible in computing net income."' 8
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, held that the expenses were or-
dinary and necessary in carrying on a trade or business. One can surmise, that
had she not chosen one of the alternatives afforded her by the state regulations,
she would not have been able to maintain her employment status. The court rec-
ognized the burden inflicted upon her by her employer and would not penalize
the taxpayer for her choice.
Although educational expenses had been recognized as allowable deductions
for teachers, there was little litigation in which the Hill case was applied to other
professions or businesses. Only three years later, however, in Coughlin v. Com-
missioner,19 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with the question
of whether an attorney who attended an institute on federal taxation to maintain
his skill by keeping informed of changes in the tax law could deduct the expenses
as an ordinary and necessary business expense. In that case, the taxpayer was
a member of a law firm which engaged in general practice but did considerable
tax work. The taxpayer's partners relied on him to keep them advised on that
subject. While attending the institute the attorney incurred certain expenses for
tuition, travel, board and lodging which he sought to deduct. 20 The Tax Court
was reluctant to extend the Hill case and disallowed the deduction on the ground
that the expenses were non-business ones "because of the educational and per-
sonal nature of the object pursued by the petitioner." 21 The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed, drawing a parallel to Hill, stating that attendance at the
institute was a means adopted to fulfill a professional duty to keep sharp the
tools actually used in a going trade or business.
As a direct and natural consequence of Hill and Coughlin, the Treasury De-
partment decided that certain guidelines had to be established for allowing ed-
ucational expense deductions.
In 1958, a regulation was promulgated which provided that
Expenditures made by an individual for education (including research
undertaken as part of his educational program) . . . are deductible
as ordinary and necessary business expenses (even though the educa-
tion might lead to a degree) if the education-
1. Maintains or improves the skills required by the individual in his
employment or other trade or business, or
2. Meets the express requirements of the individual's employer, or the
requirments of applicable law or regulation, imposed as a condi-
17 1921-1 Cur. Bull. No. 17-21 at 13.
18 Id. at 17.
19 203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953).
20 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5.
21 18 T.C. 528.
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tion to the retention by the individual of an established employ-
ment relationship, status or rate of compensation.
22
The regulation differentiates between the expenditures which constitute or-
dinary and necessary trade or business expenditures and those which are per-
sonal. It attempts to remove some of the speculation as to which educational
expenses will be deductible. The language of the adopted regulation is taken
practically verbatim from Hill and Coughlin.
The Treasury Department's efforts initially were futile. In fact, the regula-
tion was a Pandora's box. Considerable litigation resulted. In Devereaux v.
Commissioner,28 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted with the
question of whether a college professor could deduct the educational expenses
he incurred while working toward a doctoral degree. The taxpayer had been ap-
pointed to the faculty of a university. At the time of his appointment and at all
times thereafter, the university required assistant professors to have a terminal
degree before tenure would be granted. A letter was written by the head of the
taxpayer's department to the dean of the school requesting that permanent tenure
be granted. The letter contained a statement that the taxpayer made assurances
that he would begin studying for a doctorate. Tenure was granted, and the tax-
payer periodically continued his pursuit of a Ph.D. The expenses he incurred
in doing so he sought to deduct as ordinary and necessary business expenses.
The Tax Court disallowed the deductions on the grounds that after tenure was
granted, the continued education was not primarily to maintain his position.
The basis for this decision was the acquisition of a capital asset concept ex-
pressed in Welch v. Helvering24 by Mr. Justice Cardozo. The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed and held that the taxpayer began his studies to induce the
university to renew his contract and thereby to maintain the same status and
salary he then had. Unless he could secure his present status, any aspiration of
promotion or increase in salary would be greatly diminished.
Applying the regulation to Devereaux, there should not have been any doubt
as to the deductibility of the educational expense. The taxpayer had no immedi-
ate aspiration of obtaining a new position or an increase in salary. He was com-
pelled to enhance his education as a condition to retain his established employ-
ment, status and rate of compensation.
Certain examples should be scrutinized in order to determine with some de-
gree of probability whether a deduction will be allowed. In Sandt v. CommLs-
sioner,25 for example, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided that a research
chemist who attended law school was not allowed to deduct his educational costs.
The taxpayer had done satisfactory work and his job was not in jeopardy. After
several years, he learned that his employer had a vacancy in the position of pa-
22 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5.
23 292 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1961).
24 290 U. S. 111 (1933).
25 303 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1962).
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tent chemist in the patent and contracts division. He was informed by the de-
partment manager that upon assuming the new position he would be required to
obtain a legal education. The Tax Court, in applying subparagraph (2), dis-
allowed the deduction on the ground that the expenditures were incurred pri-
marily to obtain a new position and not to retain existing employment. Although
the taxpayer would have been able to retain the new position, the court found
that the further education was a means of attaining the minimum qualifications
of a new trade. While the court recognized that there could exist more than one
purpose for advanced education, it followed earlier language that "where several
purposes exist as the motivation for undertaking the expenditure, it is the pri-
mary one that is decisive in determining deductibility. ' 26
In Commissioner v. Johnson,27 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided
that educational expense deductions would be allowed when there are dual ob-
jectives. The taxpayer had a temporary teaching certificate although she had not
yet qualified for a permanent position. At the end of the academic year, she had
been rehired on the condition that she qualify for issuance of a second certificate
by attending summer school. The Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found that there were two motivating factors for the education, namely
that of securing the right to continue under a temporary certificate and that of
completing a college education. The courts found that the issuance of the tem-
porary teaching certificate was indicative that the taxpayer had met the minimum
requirements of her trade. The fact that the courses she selected would also as-
sist her in eventually securing a permanent certificate was considered incidental
to her primary reason for taking additional education, that of acquiring a full-
time teaching certificate.28
The Sandt and Johnson cases spell out that intent necessary to comply with
the regulation.
In Sandt, the taxpayer intended to meet his employer's requirements to
acquire a new position, a patent chemist. He did not create an educational expen-
diture to meet the express requirements of his employer as a condition to retention
of his employment status. Rather, his intent was to fulfill a personal aspira-
tion, to attain a higher employment status and increased salary. The Johnson
case, on the other hand, is illustrative of the liberal construction of subparagraph
(2). The logic of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is clear. The taxpayer al-
ready had a temporary teaching certificate which was the minimum requirement
26 Marlor v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1958) 1 AFTR 2d 813, 814.
27 313 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1963) ; accord, United States v. Michaelson, 313 F.2d 668 (9th
Cir. 1963). The court was faced with the problem of determining where the demarcation line
shall be drawn between current business expenses of a teacher and those of a preparatory
and qualifying character. The State Board of Education required a fifth year of education
after meeting two other compulsory requirements in order to receive a general teaching cer-
tificate. The taxpayer had been issued a provisional certificate and it was necessary for her
continued employment that she comply with the provision. The court found that the provi-
sional certificate met the minimum requirements of the trade.
28 Id.
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in her profession. This factual situation is similar to that in Devereaux. If the
taxpayer there refused to undertake the additional education she would not be
rehired. It is important to note that the taxpayer in Johnson was not permitted
to deduct the expenses incurred to secure the temporary certificate. Distinguish-
ing Sandt, the taxpayer in Johnson did not manifest an intent to meet the
minimum requirements of a new trade.
When educational expense deductions are taken pursuant to subparagraph
(2), the express request of the employer must be shown or the existence of some
law or regulation is determinative of the deductibility. If the taxpayer can pro-
duce a written request from his employer, that will generally be sufficient for
allowing the deduction under subparagraph (2). If, however, the written request
requires the taxpayer to undertake the additional education to meet the minimum
requirements of a new trade, employment relationship, or status, the deduction
will not be allowed.
When an educational expense deduction is taken under subparagraph (1),29
liberal construction of the regulation has not been prevalent. In fact, there has
been little consistency between the decisions rendered by the Tax Court and those
by the Federal District Courts. The federal courts have generally construed sub-
paragraph (1) liberally3" while the Tax Court has been quite restrictive.31 The
dichotomy is readily apparent when comparing two recent cases determined on
substantially the same facts. In Condit v. Commissioner,3 2 the Tax Court was
confronted with the question of whether an accountant who served as office busi-
ness manager and attended law school at night could deduct the cost of his ed-
ucation. His duties included investigating personal injury claims and property
damage claims. He was also instrumental in the negotiation of contracts for
two corporations. The taxpayer enrolled in law school expressing a desire to take
29 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5.
80 Campbell v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Pa. 1966). (Forensic pathologist
allowed deduction of expenses of acquiring a law degree despite the fact that he knew only
four out of two hundred forensic pathologists having a law degree) ; Greenberg v. Commis-
sioner, 367 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1966) (psychiatrist who completed one year of residency
thereby qualifying for the practice of psychiatry, attended a program for psychoanalysis);
Markham v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (psychologist undertook psy-
choanalytical training to become a psychoanalyst and/or psychotherapist) ; Frank Kilgannon
24 CCH Tax Ct. mem. 619 (1965) (accountant studied law); Fortney v. Campbell, CCH
1964 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep., U.S. Tax cas. (64-1) 9489 (N.D. Texas 1964) (Internal Revenue
examiner acquired a law degree) ; Milton L. Schultz, 23 CCH Stand. Fed. Tax Rep., U.S.
Tax cas. 1372 (1964) (Internal Revenue agent attended law school and was allowed a de-
duction despite his intent to qualify as an estate and gift examiner).
81 Carroll v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. No. 22 (November 1968). Carroll was employed as
an investigator with the Chicago Police Department. A general order was issued encourag-
ing college education. Subsequently, Carroll enrolled in college stating in his admission ap-
plication that he wished to prepare for law. His courses were in accordance with the pre-
requisites for law school admission. The court found that a general college curriculum in-
creased overall competence and was inconsistent with maintaining or improving skills; ac-
cord, Baker v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. No. 26 (December, 1968) ; Condit v. Commissioner,
329 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1962).
82 329 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1962) afJ'g 210 F. Supp. 597, 62, 245-P-H Memo. T.C.
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only those courses which would help him improve the skills his employment re-
quired. The law school, however, did not permit students to enroll for less than
a full schedule. On his admission application he answered affirmatively the ques-
tion "Do you wish to adopt the legal profession as a life's work?" Also, when
asked to state his future plans, the taxpayer answered that he would return to
his employer and combine his accounting background with law and develop cor-
poration law. The taxpayer, at trial, explained these statements in light of all
circumstances, i.e. that because of the nature of the corporation he would per-
form the same duties. After taking the bar examination, the taxpayer did in fact
return to his employer. The employer never promised the taxpayer any advance-
ment or increases in remuneration upon the completion of his education. Despite
the taxpayer's overt manifestations of his intent to improve his skills and apply
these skills to his present employment, the Tax Court placed significant empha-
sis upon the answer given in the admission application. Consequently, the court
held that when the taxpayer completed his legal education he would not neces-
sarily have returned to his employer in the position he held before his legal ed-
ucation. His duties might now include those which are peculiar to the legal pro-
fession. The court stated that "the fact that the employer will not change is not
the criteria [sic] in determining whether educational expenses are primarily for
the purpose of improving skills in that person's present position . . . . The fact
that the taxpayer had enrolled in a complete program of legal education to qual-
ify to meet the minimum standards of the legal profession was conclusive. Clearly,
meeting the minimum requirements of a new trade is not within the purview of
subparagraph (1). It is evident that had the taxpayer taken only those courses
which were directly related to the skills he already used in his employment, the
education deduction certainly would have been allowed.
An inconsistent decision was reached in Welsh v. United States.84 There, the
taxpayer, an employee of the Internal Revenue Service in the Fraud Group, had
been promised a transfer to the Intelligence Division and subsequently enrolled
in law school. In fact, law school attendance was a customary practice for the
other men in that division. On the admission application, the taxpayer made an
affirmative statement about his intent to adopt the legal profession as a life's
work. Shortly after passing the bar examination he terminated his employment
and entered general legal practice. Finding that the proximity in time between
passing the bar and leaving his employment only raised a permissive inference
of his intent at the commencement of his education, the Federal District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio held that the shortness in time was only proof
of his intention at the time of the specific act. The inference was refuted, accord
ing to the court, when viewing intent in light of all other facts. In addition to the
taxpayer's testimony that he did not formulate his intention to leave his employ-
ment until after he met the qualifying standards of the legal profession, recogni-
tion was given to his demeanor and prior war record. The fact that the taxpayer
3 62, 245 P-H Memo. T.C. at 43-75.
84 329 F.2d (6th Cir. 1962).
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had been a war veteran and needed security influenced the court to find that the
taxpayer had no intention to leave the security afforded by Government service.
The finding that other established members of the taxpayer's trade had already
obtained a law degree was fundamental to the court in allowing the deduction.
Applying the language in Welsh v. Helvering, 5 one might conclude that obtain-
ing a law degree would be ordinary and is within the trade or business limitation.
The court, therefore, allowed the deduction of the expenses for education as a
means of improving the taxpayer's skills.
There are differences between the Condit and Welsh cases. Although the
Treasury regulation provides that whether or not education is to maintain or im-
prove skills shall be determined from all the facts in each case, in Condit the
court placed great emphasis on the law school application. No other factors were
taken into account. In Welsh, on the other hand, the court viewed the statements
on the law school application in light of several other facts and circumstances.
It is this writer's opinion that the court in Welsh reached out to find reasons to
justify its decision. First, demeanor and prior war experiences are not facts
which are indicative of subjective intent, certainly not stronger than the mani-
fested intent expressed in Condit. Second, the short period of time between pass-
ing the bar examination and departing from employment should create a pre-
sumption of fact, not a permissive inference. It appears to be conclusive that the
taxpayer lacked the primary intent of improving his skills at the time he had un-
dertaken the education. The Sixth Circuit failed to observe a possible motive in
Welsh: to obtain a legal education at no personal cost under the guise of sub-
paragraph (2) of the Regulations.
The congeries of cases show a reluctance on the part of the courts to allow
education as a business expense. This reluctance was fostered because the Amer-
ican courts were enthralled initially by the rhetoric of Mr. Justice Cardozo. Al-
though the dictum in Welsh was used merely as illustrative of a point wholly un-
related to education, it became the basis for later decisions. It stymied progress
and stifled the education of the working populace. Education was a luxury, an
indulgence for the affluent. Soon after World War II, education was recognized
as necessary for the business man to successfully compete in the business com-
munity. The courts, in order to keep abreast of our dynamic society, recognized
the importance of education in business. In an effort to promote a better educated
population, the courts rewarded business for taking the initiative in promoting
education by allowing a business deduction for the cost incurred.
The 1958 Treasury regulation attempted to codify from case law adequate
guidelines for allowing educational expense deductions. It attempted to distin-
guish the personal expense from the trade or business expense.8 6 It attempted to
85 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
86 Whether or not education is the type referred to in sub-paragraph (1) of this
paragraph shall be determined upon the basis of all the facts of each case. If it is
customary for other established members of the taxpayer's trade or business to un-
dertake such education, the taxpayer will ordinarily be considered to have under-
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restrict the taxpayer from making arbitrary and capricious deductions. But the
regulations are virtually ineffective, and by their broad general terms have cre-
ated a chaotic state. Examination of the above cited cases demonstrates the ex-
isting confusion. Their is no uniformity of rationale and the taxpayer is neces-
sarily bewildered about the status of his deduction. Courts are overburdened
with litigation in which they must determine the deductibility of an educational
expense. The costs of litigation are a burden to all taxpayers and in many cases,
prohibitive. The result is that the individual taxpayer who cannot afford litiga-
tion is compelled to pay additional taxes.
1968 AMENDMENT
In 1967, an amendment, which became effective January 1, 1968, was pro-
mulgated which provides that:
. . . In the case of an employee, a change of duties does not constitute
a new trade or business if the new duties involve the same general type
of work as is involved in the individual's present employment. For this
purpose, all teaching and related duties shall be considered to involve
the same general type of work. The following are examples of changes
in duties which do not constitute new trades or businesses:
(a) Elementary to secondary school classroom teacher.
(b) Classroom teacher in one subject (such as mathematics) to
classroom teacher in another subject (such as science).
(c) Classroom teacher to guidance counselor.
(d) Classroom teacher to principal.37
The latest amendment will have a great influence upon the amount of litiga-
tion. A taxpayer will not be refused an educational deduction so long as his
duties are generally the same as before his education. However, the new provi-
sion specifically benefits teachers. While the Treasury Department states that the
examples cited are only illustrative of the "same general type of work," the ap-
plication of the subparagraph to later examples seems inconsistent.3 8 Although
taken this education for the purposes described in subparagraph (1) of this para-
graph. Expenditures for education of the type described in subparagraph (2) of
this paragraph are deductible under subparagraph (2) only to the extent that they
are for the minimum education required by the taxpayer's employer, or by applica-
ble law or regulations, as a condition to the retention of the taxpayer's salary, status
or employment. Expenditures for education other than those so required may be de-
ductible under subparagraph (1) of this paragraph if the education meets the qual-
ifications of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph. A taxpayer is considered to have
made expenditures for education to meet the express requirements of his employer
only if the requirement is imposed primarily for a bona fide business purpose of
the taxpayer's employer and not primarily for the taxpayer's benefit. Except as pro-
vided in the last sentence of paragraph (b) of this section, in the case of teachers,
a written statement from an authorized official or school officer to the effect that the
education was required as a condition to the retention of the taxpayer's salary,
status or employment will be accepted for the purpose of meeting the requirements
of this paragraph.
87 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 Subparagraph 3.
8 (1) A, a self-employed individual practicing a profession other than law, for
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only examples, they appear to be regarded as a statement of the law by many
courts. Accordingly, it appears that attending law school and obtaining a law
degree has been eliminated as a possible educational expense unless the facts are
clearly within the language of the new regulation. While it may be true that there
has been considerable litigation concerning legal education, that is no reason to
expressly refuse a deduction. The only result achieved by the exclusion of obtain-
ing a law degree is to reduce the litigation in a very narrow area. However, in
light of the express provisions of the amendment, the Condit case is clearly in-
consistent. In that case, the taxpayer's duties did not change. After he passed the
bar examination he returned to his employer and resumed his former duties. This
is clearly within the same general type of work. It appears that the Commissioner
recognized the dichotomy between Welsh and Condit when passing the new reg-
ulation. Rather than permit a paradoxical situation to continue, the regulation is
an attempt to correct the problem.
In fact, the examples concerning teachers are inconsistent with the general
provision. Subparagraph (d),3 9 for example, indicates that a change from a
classroom teacher to principal does not constitute a new trade. This is not a
change from one type of work to other work of the same general type. The duty
of a classroom teacher is to impart knowledge and instruct students. The duty
of a principal, on the other hand, is to act as an administrator. These duties ap-
pear to be mutually independent. It does not appear, at least to this writer, that
the respective functions constitute the same general type of work. It appears that
the new amendment is inequitable. It allows a taxpayer who frequently changes
employers and takes courses to aid him in his position to deduct these expenses.
Concurrently, these courses might be accumulated toward a degree which meets
the standards of a new profession. It seems a paradox to allow an individual a
deduction for all but one course he takes to improve his skills and then penalize
him for taking the one extra course which qualifies him for a new trade or pro-
fession. Since the courts are willing to scrutinize the intent of the taxpayer to
allow the deduction initially, they should also examine the motivation for taking
the final qualifying course. Many taxpayers take the extra course for purely per-
sonal satisfaction, knowing that they can meet higher standards. Many others
may feel that they should have something to show for their extra years of study,
example, engineering, accounting, etc., attends law school at night and after
completing his law school studies receives a bachelor of laws degree. The
expenditures made by A in attending law school are nondeductible because
this course of study qualifies him for a new trade or business.(2) Assume the same facts as in example (1) except that A has the status of
an employee rather than a self-employed individual, and that his employer
requires him to obtain a bachelor of laws degree. A intends to continue
practicing his nonlegal profession as an employee of such employer. Never-
theless, the expenditures made by A in attending law school are not de-
ductible since this course of study qualifies him for a new trade or business.
Although the taxpayer in example (2) may be doing the same general type of work, perhaps
the same work, he will not be given the tax benefit which the new amendment expressly al-
lows. Example (2) is consistent with the Condit case, but it does not appear to follow the
express provisions of the amendment.
89 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 subparagraph 3.
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namely some kind of degree. The list of possible motives is lengthy and beyond
the scope of this article. The possible motives are left to the ingenuity of the tax-
payer, the recognition of these motives for the courts.
Although there has not been any case law with respect to the new amend-
ment, the trend in the past is indicative that the dichotomy will continue.
In retrospect, a cursory examination of the congeries of cases would un-
doubtedly leave any taxpayer bewildered about the status of the law regarding
educational expense deductions. Almost two decades have elapsed since the initial
inroad in Hill of the original Internal Revenue Act,40 but the law in this area ap-
pears to be in the embryonic stage. Although the adoption of Treasury Regula-
tion Section 1.162-541 attempted to reduce the area of deductible expenses, the
criterion for determining whether educational expenses comply with the positive
language of the regulations is flexible. It varies according to the complexity of
our society. In today's dynamic and competitive environment, specialization is
a pre-requisite of success. The fact that further education will equip the taxpayer
with a specialty is irrelevant if the taxpayer can manifest that his primary intent
is to enhance his competence in a pre-existing vocation. The only pragmatic lim-
itation on education expense allowance should be that there be a reasonable
nexus between the courses taken and the skills to be improved as well as the pur-
pose. Then, the social and economic goals of society will be best served.
M viN A. MILER
40 38 Stat. 1067.
41 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 1.162-5.
